The relationship between insurance coverage and use of specialty substance use disorder (SUD) treatment is not well understood. In this study, we add to the literature by examining changes in admissions to SUD treatment following the implementation of a 2010 Affordable Care Act provision requiring health insurers to offer dependent coverage to young adult children of their beneficiaries under age 26. We use national administrative data on admissions to specialty SUD treatment and apply a difference-in-differences design to study effects of the expansion on the rate of treatment utilization among young adults and, among those in treatment, changes in insurance status and payment source. We find that admissions to treatment declined by 11% after the expansion. However, the share of young adults covered by private insurance increased by 5.4 percentage points and the share with private insurance as the payment source increased by 3.7 percentage points. This increase was largely offset by decreased payment from government sources.
INTRODUCTION
A key objective of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been to expand health insurance coverage to populations with historically limited access to healthcare services. In September 2010, an early provision of the ACA required private health insurers to offer dependent coverage to young adult children of their beneficiaries under age 26.
1 Federal law previously only required private insurers to offer coverage to dependent children under age 19 and to full-time students under 23 years (Goldman, 2013) . Studies suggest that the ACA-dependent coverage provision expanded insurance coverage to over two million young adults (Akosa Antwi et al., 2013; Sommers et al., 2013) .
In this study, we examine the impact of the young adult provision on utilization of specialty treatment for substance use disorders (SUDs). We draw on a sample of admissions (i.e., new entrants) from the Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS), a rich, administrative data set that annually covers more than two million admissions to specialty SUD treatment facilities. The sample includes admissions to specialty facilities that offer detoxification and rehabilitation treatment. Following the literature that examines the dependent coverage provision, we apply a differences-in-differences (DD) model. Our treatment group is young adults of 21-24 years, and our comparison group is a sample of older adults (30-34 years). We consider three sets of outcomes: rates of admissions to treatment, patient insurance status, and patient payment source.
By examining both insurance status and payment source, we can examine whether newly insured patients were able to use their insurance to cover treatment costs. Classic demand theory would suggest that insurance expansions increase the number of individuals seeking care by providing a new source of payment for this care and reducing out-of-pocket cost. Thus, insurance expansions would be hypothesized to increase the number of people in treatment, while at the same time shifting costs borne by non-insurance sources to insurers. Such a response might be greater for SUD treatment than general health care, as SUD treatment has been historically characterized by a relatively low degree of health insurance payments (both public and private) and has instead been primarily financed by out-of-pocket and government payers (Wisdom et al., 2010) .
However, insurance expansions can also improve health overall (leading to a lower demand for SUD treatment). They can also lead to changes in the settings where treatment is received, with more people leaving safety net providers to seek care from exclusively private sources. Finally, the increase in the number of individuals with private insurance might lag behind the acceptance of this insurance by providers because of a lack of capacity to accept such insurance or because of an insurer's reluctance to pay for SUD treatment. All of these factors may reduce the pure demand response.
Indeed, we find that compared to admissions for adults aged 30-34, admissions decreased by 11% for adults aged 21-24. By contrast, we find substantial positive effects on private insurance coverage and payment source. Overall, the share of adults aged 21-24 in treatment with private insurance increased by 5.4 percentage points compared to that of adults aged 30-34. This increase in private insurance admissions was primarily offset by declines in the share of adults in treatment aged 21-24 who were uninsured. Private insurance as a source of payment for treatment more than doubled relative to adults aged 30-34. Increased private payment was largely offset by decreased payment from state and local governments. These findings suggest that the provision increased both private insurance coverage among young adults seeking treatment for SUDs and their ability to use their newly acquired private insurance to pay for treatment. Our event study reveals that differences between the two groups increased in the 2 years after the policy change, suggesting some policy dynamics.
Overall, the provision appears to have reduced government responsibility in the financing of specialty SUD treatment, both by reducing the number of patients receiving treatment and by shifting payment from public to private payers. Our back-of-the-envelope estimate implies increased annual private payment of $54m with offsetting savings split by state and local governments and self-payers.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
A recent estimate places the total societal burden of alcohol and illicit drugs at almost $US540bn (in 2016 dollars) (Caulkins et al., 2014) . SUDs are associated with morbidity and mortality (Carpenter and Dobkin, 2009) , increased utilization of general health care (Balsa et al., 2009) , traffic fatalities (Adams et al., 2011) , crime and violence (Markowitz, 2005) , and reduced productivity in the labor market (Mullahy and Sindelar, 1996) . Importantly, SUD treatment has been shown to cost-effectively reduce SUDs and minimize associated social costs (Popovici and French, 2013) .
Despite these benefits, SUD treatment is underutilized among individuals who could potentially benefit from such treatment, and particularly among young adults (SAMHSA, 2014a) . Only 1 in 10 adults that meet the clinical criteria for diagnosis of an SUD receive such treatment in any given year (SAMHSA, 2014a) . In addition, individuals with SUDs are substantially more likely than those without SUDs to lack health insurance (Beronio et al., 2013) .
Insurance coverage and demand for care
Following basic demand theory, insurance expansions should lead to an increase in the quantity of SUD treatment demanded among newly insured consumers by lowering out-of-pocket price of care. The substantial underutilization of SUD treatment among young adults and the high uninsured rate in this population support three hypotheses.
H1: Expanded access to private health insurance will increase the use of specialty SUD treatment among newly insured young adults.
H2: After private insurance expansions, an increased proportion of young adults in specialty SUD treatment will hold private insurance coverage, and this increase will be offset by reductions in public insurance or uninsurance.
H3: After private insurance expansions, an increased proportion of young adults in specialty SUD treatment will use private insurance to pay for their treatment, and this increase will be offset by reductions in public insurance, self-payment, and payment by state/localities.
These hypotheses provide a conceptual starting point for our analysis. However, there are unique features of the patients who receive SUD treatment, the willingness of insurers to cover SUD services, and constraints among providers who offer SUD treatment that suggest private insurance expansions may not straightforwardly lead to increased utilization, private insurance coverage, and use of private insurance to pay for treatment. We next discuss these factors.
Patients
Private insurance coverage could alter whether the newly insured utilize SUD treatment, but how much they change their utilization is an open question. On the one hand, demand for behavioral health treatment (i.e., SUD and mental health) is more sensitive to price than general health care (Frank and McGuire, 2000) , and pent-up demand for SUD treatment may be particularly strong given the high uninsured rate among those needing treatment. Indeed, financial barriers are the most common reason for not receiving treatment among those individuals with SUDs who said that they have sought, but did not receive, treatment in the prior year (SAMHSA, 2014b) . On the other hand, a larger segment of individuals who do not receive treatment report that they either do not want treatment or are not ready to stop their substance use (SAMHSA, 2014b) . Such individuals likely have a price-inelastic demand for SUD treatment.
Gaining coverage could also alter the settings in which individuals receive treatment. As described in Section 2.4, SUD treatment is primarily delivered in specialty settings, which vary in their resources and acceptance of uninsured individuals. Gaining private insurance could allow individuals to shift their care to more resource-intensive settings that would not otherwise admit an uninsured patient. A small, but growing, segment of individuals also receive treatment outside of specialty facilities in private physicians' offices (SAMHSA, 2014b) . For example, individuals with opioid use disorder who require medication-assisted treatment may desire to switch from daily visits to a public sector methadone maintenance treatment program that accepts uninsured patients to a buprenorphine treatment program through a private physicians' office. Shifts in setting may thus reflect the needs and preferences of the newly insured.
to 21% over the same time period, self-payment has decreased slightly, and payment from other state, local, and federal sources has remained largely unchanged, comprising more than one-third of payment in all years .
Increasing insurer participation, especially private insurance participation, requires both individuals to gain coverage and for insurers to provide payment for treatment. Although the large majority of private insurance plans offered some SUD treatment during the study period, levels of coverage varied. A 2010 survey of employer plans conducted early in the implementation of the 2008 federal Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) found that almost all plans covered short-term hospitalizations and outpatient treatment for SUD care but that only about 80% covered residential treatment programs and about two-thirds covered opioid treatment programs (Horgan et al., 2016) . The same survey found that relatively high cost sharing was common: half of all plans had copayments or coinsurance per visit for SUD services exceeding $20 or 20%, respectively. One implication is that patients in treatment programs may have not necessarily used their insurance to pay for treatment, opting instead for self-payment or safety net programs.
The MHPAEA has increased requirements for insurers who do offer SUD treatment to eliminate discriminatory coverage practices such as restrictions on the number of visits or settings where treatment is provided that are deemed more stringent than for physical health conditions. Provisions of MHPAEA became effective in 2010, but further regulatory guidance has been continually released by federal agencies. Surveys of insurers indicate that MHPAEA has increased the scope and coverage of SUD treatment in private insurance plans (Horgan et al., 2015) ; however, other data indicate that compliance with MHPAEA provisions has been incomplete within plans (Berry et al., 2015) and that consumers still are unsure about what has changed due to MHPAEA (Firth et al., 2016) .
Providers
SUD treatment has historically been segregated from general health care in the USA, and there is a strong tradition of self-help treatment (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous). In 2014, more than half of the individuals who reported any prior year treatment received self-help care. Self-help groups are often used to boost long-term abstinence or as an adjunct to care received in a specialty program overseen by a counseling or medical professional (American Society of Addiction Medicine, 2005) . Most specialty care takes place in rehabilitation and detoxification facilities (primarily delivered on an outpatient basis, although some care is also provided in residential facilities). Rehabilitation facilities (both outpatient and residential) are often stand-alone entities that vary widely in their medical orientation (e.g., whether they have a supervising physician), use of medication-assisted treatments and counseling programs, and provision of supportive services such as vocational programs. Resource constraints are particularly acute in some treatment programs, such as safety net facilities that serve indigent or reduced-fee patients (Buck, 2011) . Detoxification, which is the medically supervised treatment of acute withdrawal from substances, is sometimes provided within the context of rehabilitation programs but can also be delivered in hospital units.
While our focus in this paper is on care received in detoxification and rehabilitation facilities, it is important to note that treatment programs are sometimes provided in other settings. These include mental health centers, psychiatric hospitals, or private physician's office settings (particularly for opioid use disorder). These settings may, to some extent, substitute for rehabilitation facilities.
Approximately two-thirds of rehabilitation and detoxification programs receive some public funding (and are thus part of the TEDS sample, described in Section 3.1). More than half of the public funding for SUD treatment is provided by state and local funding grants, supported in part by block grant funding from the federal government (SAMHSA, 2013) . Dependence on public funding and capacity to accept insurance payment varies widely. Buck (2011) notes that on the eve of ACA implementation, modern billing systems necessary for receiving payment from Medicaid and private insurance were lacking in many SUD treatment facilities-one-fifth of all facilities lacked any kind of electronic information system. This lack of billing capacity may further impede the ability of providers to expand access to the newly privately insured (Guerrero et al., 2014) . Using data from the 2013 National Survey of States Substance Abuse Treatment Systems, a survey of all SUD treatment facilities known to SAMHSA, we find that 34% of rehabilitation and detoxification facilities did not accept any private health insurance.
We predict that the share of individuals with private insurance will increase after a private insurance expansion (H2) and that there will also be an increase collection of private insurance payment (H3). However, the increased revenue collection may be attenuated by billing capacity constraints that exist in some facilities and by the relative reluctance of insurance plans to cover SUD treatment. On the other hand, private insurance may offer higher reimbursement rates to providers, and thus, the dependent coverage provision may induce providers to incur the fixed costs of accepting more private insurance and therefore offset the historically limited role of insurance within the SUD treatment delivery system. Those patients who gain private insurance through the dependent coverage provision may also have lower marginal costs relative to the publicly insured or uninsured, which could further induce providers to accept the newly insured. For example, Maclean et al. (2015) document that following passage of state SUD parity laws that expanded coverage for SUD treatment services within private markets, SUD treatment providers were more likely to accept private insurance.
Related research
Within the growing literature on the ACA-dependent coverage provision, few studies have examined behavioral health treatment. Two studies examine mental health and SUD treatment without disaggregating by disorder. Fronstin (2013) examines data from a large employer and finds that young adults covered by the dependent coverage provision were more likely to use mental health and SUD treatment than other individuals enrolled in the plan. Ali et al. (2016) finds that out-of-pocket spending decreased for behavioral health disorders but does not separately examine SUDs.
Additionally, three recent studies have attempted to disentangle the effect of the dependent coverage provision on use of SUD treatment independent of mental health treatment. Akosa Antwi et al. (2015) find that the provision increased hospitalizations for psychoses among young adults, but not for SUDs. By contrast, Golberstein et al. (2014) find that the provision was associated with a modest increase in psychiatric admissions to general hospitals, with admissions for SUDs accounting for the largest increase. Using the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), Saloner and Cook (2014) find that the provision increased use of mental health treatment by 17% among young adults relative to a comparison sample of older adults but had no discernible effect on SUD treatment use. Saloner and Cook also find no significant differences in the percentage of individuals receiving SUD treatment that were paid for with private insurance.
These studies are important but leave several remaining questions to be answered. First, two of the studies focus on only one modality of treatment (inpatient hospital) where only a relatively small share of individuals receives SUD care. Second, while Saloner and Cook do consider the range of settings, they rely on a small sample and may lack statistical power to detect policy effects. Indeed, the 95% confidence intervals prevent the authors from rejecting non-trivial increases in use. We extend these findings by considering a wider range of SUD treatment settings (including some visits to inpatient hospitals), assess heterogeneity across patient demographics, and use a large-scale administrative data set, reducing concerns regarding statistical power.
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS

Data
Our primary data source is the 2007-2013 TEDS, an administrative database compiled by SAMHSA in cooperation with state agencies for the purposes of monitoring the quantity and quality of specialty SUD treatment in the USA. TEDS includes information on approximately two million annual admissions to specialty SUD treatment ('admissions' represent entry into SUD treatment, and individuals can have multiple admissions per year). Most facilities reporting to the TEDS receive at least some public funding in the form of either grants, subsidies, or participation in public insurance programs. The data include most admissions to specialty SUD treatment facilities in the USA that provide rehabilitation or detoxification programs.
2 TEDS is commonly utilized by economists to study SUD treatment in the USA (Anderson, 2010; Dave and Mukerjee, 2011; Jena and Goldman, 2011; Pacula et al., 2013) and is used by the US government to estimate economic and service use outcomes related to SUDs.
While TEDS is not a national probability sample, patients receiving treatment in TEDS facilities are arguably representative of the broader SUD treatment-receiving population. For example, TEDS contains typical inpatient and outpatient treatment programs, including methadone maintenance programs and care provided in hospital-based detoxification programs.
3 As noted, TEDS does not include specialty treatment received in private physician's offices, facilities that do not receive any public funding, emergency departments, and self-help groups. However, the demographics of individuals in the TEDS are comparable to a nationally representative sample of individuals who report having received SUD treatment from the NSDUH (Gfroerer et al., 2014) . The TEDS includes state identifiers, but there are no variables identifying specific facilities. We are therefore unable to compare changes within facilities over time. We note this as a study limitation.
The ACA-dependent coverage provision applies to persons aged 19-25, but using the categories available in the TEDS, 4 we defined the treated young adult group as individuals age 21-24 (the next youngest age group included age 18, which was eligible for dependent coverage prior to the ACA). We defined our comparison group as individuals aged 30-34. We defined this group as the preferred comparison group because the adjacent older age group in TEDS, ages 25-29, includes 25-year-olds who were also affected by the provision. The trade-off to using the 30-34 age group as a comparison is that they are potentially less similar than the adjacent age group, 25-29 years, and might be differently affected by economic conditions or other contemporaneous factors. However, as we show in Section 4.6, our results are similar if we use the 25-to 29-year-olds as the comparison group.
There are 13,345,895 admissions in the 2007-2013 TEDS. We made several exclusions to form our analysis sample (Table I) . First, we excluded admissions outside our age groups (21-24 and 30-34 years), leaving us with 3,278,212 admissions. Second, we excluded admissions where the referral source was the criminal justice system as such admissions are likely to be coerced, rather than voluntary (Dave and Mukerjee, 2011) , leaving us with 1,997,218 observations. Third, we excluded the 2010 TEDS from the sample as we lack information to separate months before and after the policy change. This leaves us with 1,708,104 observations for the analysis of admissions.
Fourth, for the insurance analysis, we restricted the sample to individuals receiving treatment in the 25 states where health insurance status is reported in the TEDS for 85% or more of all observations in each year between 2007 and 2013. Health insurance is not a core variable in the TEDS; instead, a subset of states provides this information on a voluntary basis. This exclusion leaves us with 682,670 observations for the health insurance coverage analysis. Fifth, for our analyses on payment source, we restricted the sample to the 18 states that contain information on expected payment source.
5 This leaves us with 404,628 observations for the payment sample analysis.
Covariates
Substance use disorder treatment outcomes are determined by many factors. To capture such factors, we augment the TEDS with information from several sources. First, we merge into the TEDS state-level demographic measures from the Annual and Social Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, and rural residence).
We use the American Community Survey (ACS) to construct age-specific unemployment rates (Ruggles et al., 2015) . 6 Specifically, we construct unemployment rates matched to our treatment (21-24 years) and comparison (30-34 years) groups. Following established methods, our grouping captures unemployment rates for individuals reporting their current employment circumstances in each study year. We merge these unemployment rates into the TEDS by treatment group, state, and year. Controlling for the unemployment rate enables us to better account for the impact of the economy on the treatment and comparison groups, particularly because SUD prevalence and thus need for treatment are known to vary with the business cycle (Carpenter et al., 2016; Dávalos et al., 2012) . The dependent coverage provision was implemented in the backdrop of the 2007-2009 recession, which is arguably the largest economic downturn in the post-World War II era. This recession did not have a uniform labor market effect: young adults experienced worse outcomes (e.g., higher levels of unemployment) than slightly older adults (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). Moreover, access to private health insurance is tightly linked to employment over our study period (Cawley et al., 2015) .
Outcomes
We examine three sets of outcomes: (1) rates of admissions to treatment; (2) insurance status of patients; and (3) expected payment source for patient treatment. As noted in Section 2.4, in the context of SUDs, it is important to separately study insurance and payment source as an individual's insurer may not always pay for SUD treatment.
For all of our analyses, we aggregate our data to the age group-year-state level. Our estimates of admissions are expressed as a rate: admissions to treatment per 1000 individuals in that age group (21-24 and 30-34 years), by state. To determine the denominator of individuals in each age group, we use population data from the US Census.
For our analysis of insurance coverage, we calculate the share of patients with insurance in four categories: private health insurance, Medicaid, other public health insurance (military and Medicare), and no insurance. For our analysis of payment source, we focus on four types of payments: private health insurance, Medicaid, state and local grants payers, and self-pay. Although it is possible that a treatment admission can be paid for with one type of payment, the TEDS defines the primary payer as whichever entity supports more than 50% of the cost of treatment. 
Methods
We use difference-in-differences (DD) models to compare changes in the rate of admissions, and insurance status and payment source between young adults and older adults. These models identify the average effect of the dependent coverage provision as any changes in the study outcomes within the targeted population of young adults aged 21-24 after the provision relative to changes in the same outcomes within a comparison group of older adults aged 30-34 years.
For our DD models, we estimate the impact of the dependent coverage provision with Equation 1:
where Y ist represents an SUD outcome for age group i, where i = 21-to 24-year-olds or 30-to 34-year-olds, in state s during year t. The variable Post t represents a dummy variable that has a value of 1 for the years after the implementation of the law (2011-2013) and 0 otherwise. The variable Treat i is a binary variable for membership in the 21-24 age group. The interaction of Post t and Treat i captures the DD estimate. We include UE ist , the age-specific state unemployment rate (we use a separate state-specific unemployment rate for the treatment group and comparison group), and C st , a vector of state-level time-varying controls. We included year fixed effects (τ t ,) state fixed effects (S s ), and state-specific linear time trends (Z st ). State fixed effects absorb idiosyncratic time-invariant state-level variation. Year fixed effects capture changes in factors that impact our outcomes and affect the nation as a whole. State-specific linear time trends account (in a parametric manner) for time-varying unobserved state-level factors (e.g., social norms regarding addiction).
We estimate weighted least squares regression models for all our outcomes and cluster standard errors at the year-state level. We use age group-state-year population as weights for our regression models. Clustering in this manner may lead us to underestimate our standard errors as the standard errors may be vulnerable to serial correlation. Therefore, we estimate standard errors using the wild cluster bootstrap. Following the example of Cameron et al. (2008) , our wild cluster bootstrap estimation aggregates our data to the age group and year levels. With the resulting 12 observations, we estimate a simplified version of Equation 1 8 :
4. RESULTS Figure 1 displays unadjusted mean admissions rates per 1000, proportions of admissions with an insurance type in the full sample and in the samples from the states reporting insurance and payment source. In all three samples, overall admission rates declined for both young adults and older adults after the law, but the decrease was steeper for older adults. Figure 2 displays admission trends separately examining each treatment setting. While individuals aged 21-24 had higher admission rates than those aged 30-34 to non-intensive outpatient settings prior to the provision, the trend reversed in 2010. Trends were less marked in other settings. Figure 3 illustrates that after 2010, the share of admissions with private insurance increased among adults aged 21-24, while declining in the comparison group. The share of admissions with Medicaid increased in 2010 and then remained flat afterwards for both groups. Before 2010, the share of admissions without insurance was similar for the treatment and comparison groups, but after 2010, the uninsured share of adults aged 21-24 declined substantially while declining more gradually for adults aged 30-34. There was a decline in other insurance for both groups after 2010.
Summary statistics
Similar to the insurance coverage estimates, the trends in payment source show an increase in private insurance payment (Figure 4) . The share of admissions with Medicaid as a payer declined substantially in both groups. Self-payment as a source of payment decreased for both groups in 2011 and increased in 2012, whereas payment by 'other sources' (i.e., state and local governments) increased more rapidly after 2010 for adults aged 30-34.
Rate of admission regression results
The top panel of Table III provides the coefficients for DD models estimating changes in the rate of admissions to treatment per 1000 adults aged 21-24 relative to those per 1000 adults aged 30-34 after 2010. We estimate this regression for three samples: the full set of TEDS states (all 50 states plus the District of Columbia), the insurance states sample (25 states), and the payment states sample (18 states). 9 The DD estimate is negative and statistically significant (À0.856 admission per 1000). Compared to a pre-ACA treatment group mean of 7.96 per 1000, this represents an 11% decrease in the rate of admissions. Estimates are negative when considering alternate samples. The estimate generated in the insurance states sample is somewhat larger (À1.173 admissions per 1000) while the estimate in the payment states sample is comparable to the main sample but not statistically significant (À0.888 admissions per 1000). Table I for more details. 10 In a complementary analysis, we drew data from a nationally representative survey data, the NSDUH, to examine whether treatment receipt changed across a variety of settings after 2010 among young adults (ages 18-25) relative to an older comparison group (ages 26-35). The NSDUH captures some treatment settings that are not represented in the TEDS (such as private physician's offices, emergency departments, and self-help groups) as well as some settings where TEDS coverage is limited (such as hospitals and mental health centers). Settings captured in the NSDUH that are most likely to parallel the TEDS are outpatient and residential rehabilitation facilities (although it is not clear when these settings exclusively accept private payment). This analysis paralleled Saloner and Cook (2014) but did not restrict the sample to individuals with a positive screen for an SUD (the distinction is important, because the analysis presented here is focused on use of treatment overall, irrespective of underlying need). We found no significant change in overall use of treatment or in use of any specific setting (Table A8 ). However, sample sizes for this analysis were small, and these results were overall inconclusive. provision, the proportion of adults aged 21-24 in treatment with private insurance increased by 5.4 percentage points (71% increase over the treatment group pre-policy mean) relative to the group aged 30-34. The increase in the share with private insurance was substantially offset by a decline among uninsured adults aged 21-24 of 3.5 percentage points (5.2% reduction over the treatment group pre-policy mean). There was also a non-significant reduction in Medicaid coverage among young adults of 2.0 percentage points and no change in other insurance.
Insurance coverage regression results
Payment source regression results
Table IV also provides changes in payment source, independent of insurance coverage type at admission. After the provision, the share of all adults aged 21-24 that had private insurance pay for their treatment admission increased by 3.7 percentage points (or 74% over the treatment group pre-policy baseline) relative to adults aged 31-34. Concurrent with the increase in private insurance payment, self-payment decreased by 1.1 percentage points (7.2% over the baseline mean). There was also a 2.2 percentage point decrease in payment by states and localities, although the change was not statistically significant.
Heterogeneity in policy effects
We next consider heterogeneity in policy effects by patient demographics (sex and race/ethnicity), substance (alcohol or illicit drugs), and treatment setting. Results for admission rates are presented in Figure 5 . Regression models on admission rates find decreases among both male and female individuals as well as nonHispanic Whites. We find no statistically significant effect of the policy on admissions among patients who are non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, or other race. We also find decreases in admissions for alcohol and illicit drugs.
VALIDITY OF STUDY DESIGN AND EXTENSIONS
Validity of the research design
We conduct an event study to explore whether our core analyses (reported in Table III) are potentially vulnerable to policy endogeneity (i.e., policies are implemented in response to changes in outcome variables rather than the policy leading to changes in outcomes). Specifically, we estimate an augmented version of Equation 1 that includes a full set of leads and lags (i.e., indicators for the years 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2013, with 2009 as the omitted category; recall that we exclude the year 2010 from our analysis sample). These estimates are obtained by interacting each year indicator with the treatment group. If we find evidence that the indicator variables on the policy leads (2007 and 2008) predict our outcome variables, this pattern of results would be consistent with the hypothesis of policy endogeneity.
Results from the event study analysis are reported in Figures 9 (admission rates), 10 (admissions stratified by treatment setting), 11 (insurance status), and 12 (payment source). Our event study analysis provides no statistically significant evidence of policy endogeneity: all coefficient estimates on the policy leads are statistically indistinguishable from zero and are generally small in magnitude. However, the policy lags (i.e., interaction variables for 2011-2013 and the treatment group indicator) suggest policy dynamics. There was not a discrete jump in 2011; instead, the policy effects emerged over time. The unit of observation is age group-state-year. All models are estimated with ordinary least squares and control for treatment group indicator, state age-specific unemployment rate, state demographics, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level and are reported in parentheses. Observations weighted by the state-age group population. *Statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
We next perform an analysis with placebo laws to further test the validity of our DD design. Using the 3 years of data (2007) (2008) (2009) Table VI . In the 18 separate placebo tests, we find no statistically significant coefficients, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the coefficients on the placebo law DDs are zero. These regressions provide further support to the validity of our design.
A concern is that some of our analysis sample does not include all states in all years because of the data collection procedures of the TEDS. Specifically, our insurance analysis includes 25 states and our payment source analysis includes 18 states. We next examine observable characteristics in our admissions, insurance, and payment source samples relative to the full sample of US states using demographic information contained in the ASEC. Results are reported in Table S1 and suggest that these groups are broadly similar in terms of age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, and urbanicity. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that these groups are different in terms of other, unobservable, characteristics.
Robustness checks within the Treatment Episode Data Set
In our core regression models (Equation 1), we include state characteristics, year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. However, a concern with this specification is that it may not adequately control for time-varying between-state differences. Specifically, time-varying unobservable factors that do not follow a linear time trend will not be accounted for in this regression. To address this concern, we reestimate a variant of Equation 1. We replace the state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends with state-by-year fixed effects. These fixed effects flexibly model between-state differences.
Results are reported in Table S2 and are not appreciably different from our core results. We include both rehabilitation and detoxification admissions in our analysis. A concern is that, among SUD treatment providers, detoxification is not generally considered treatment per se but rather a precursor to treatment (SAMHSA, 2006) . Thus, we might expect a differential response to the policy for rehabilitation and detoxification admissions. To explore this possibility, we re-estimate Equation 1 excluding detoxification-only admissions. Results are reported in Table S3 and are broadly comparable to our core findings. This pattern of results suggests that rehabilitation and detoxification, although often viewed as different forms of services by SUD treatment providers, do not appear to respond differentially to the dependent coverage provision.
We next exclude our state-level control variables to ensure that our findings are not driven by potentially endogenous right-hand-side variables (Table S4) . Findings from this analysis provide no evidence that endogenous right-hand-side variables drive our findings: regression coefficients are largely unchanged.
All of our estimates presented thus far are weighted. There is some debate within the economics literature regarding the appropriateness of weighting data when the objective of the analyses is to uncover the causal effect of a particular treatment (Solon et al., 2015) . Given this debate, we next re-estimate Equation 1 without weights. Results are reported in Table S5 and are generally larger in magnitude but consistent in significance and direction with our main findings. For example, without weights, we estimate a change in admissions of À1.311 compared to our main estimate of À0.856. Only one estimate (Medicaid insurance coverage) that was not significant in the weighted regressions becomes significant when weights are removed.
As noted earlier in the manuscript, we cluster the standard errors at the state-year level and this level of clustering may lead us to reject the null when we should not. To address this concern, we estimate standard errors using the wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008) . The estimates and p-values (in square brackets) reported in Table S6 are not appreciably different from our core findings.
We next interact the state unemployment rate with the treatment indicator. Although we use state-specific and age-specific unemployment rates in Equation 1, including the interaction term allows for a different relationship between the unemployment rate and our outcome variables. Results, reported in Table S7 are broadly comparable, although, for some outcomes, estimates are smaller and less precise than our core findings.
Benchmarking coverage estimates with national survey data
To benchmark the coverage changes in the insurance coverage of the TEDS sample to a comparable national population, we also compare trends in insurance status among young adults in treatment from 2008 to 2013 in the ACS 11 sample with the TEDS (Figure 13 ). The ACS samples of young adults in treatment are more likely to be privately insured and less likely to be uninsured than the TEDS sample but across years largely mirror the TEDS trends. The fact that the two samples differ in terms of insurance levels is not surprising given that TEDS focuses on a sample of patients receiving care for SUD treatment, a group less likely to hold insurance, and the ACS is a nationally representative sample. However, it is reassuring that -although different in terms of levels -the two samples display similar trends in these variables.
DISCUSSION
We examined changes in use of specialty SUD treatment among adults aged 21-24 before and after the implementation of the 2010 ACA provision that required most private insurers to offer dependent coverage to the 11 Health insurance questions were only added to this survey in 2008. adult children of their enrollees. As such, we build on a growing set of studies that document that the dependent coverage provision increased insurance coverage and healthcare services use (Golberstein et al., 2014; Saloner and Cook, 2014; Sommers et al., 2013) . SUDs are important to examine not only because they have a high prevalence among youth and are frequently disabling (Kessler et al., 1994) but also because insurance coverage for SUDs has historically been restricted (Buck, 2011) .
Several key findings emerge from our analysis. First, the overall rate of admissions to treatment significantly decreased among adults aged 21-24 after the provision, relative to counterparts aged 30-34. Second, relative to adults aged 30-34, the share of adults aged 21-24 covered by private insurance increased by 5.4 percentage points, or 71%. The rise in private coverage was mainly offset by a reduction in admissions with Medicaid and no insurance. Third, changes in source of payment largely tracked the insurance coverage changes. There was a 3.7 percentage point increase in payment by private insurance (74%), which was mainly offset by reductions in state and local funding. We identified heterogeneity in these treatment effects by race/ethnicity and treatment setting. For example, insurance-related effects tended to be concentrated among Whites.
The decrease in admissions among young adults runs counter to a hypothesis that increased coverage will increase use of SUD treatment and to some prior literature on SUD treatment expansions (Dave and Mukerjee, 2011; Wen et al., 2013) .
One possibility is that after 2010 some young adults may have substituted specialty rehabilitation and detoxification treatment in public settings for treatment in other settings.
12 Substitution across settings, if it in fact occurs, could be beneficial insofar as it more appropriately places the patient in a suitable level of care.
12 Our analysis with the NSDUH was intended to test for these possibilities, but we lacked adequate sample size to yield any conclusive results (see footnote 12).
Moreover, we lack adequate information about patient's needs to assess how the dependent coverage provision may lead to transitions to more suitable levels of care, although this issue is recognized as an important dimension for the quality of addiction care (SAMHSA, 2006) . Another possible explanation for the reduction in service use due to the dependent coverage provision is that the general health of young adults may have improved over the study period, reducing their overall need for SUD treatment (Barbaresco et al., 2015) , or that young adults experienced a disproportionate reduction in substance use over the time period. Other factors on the provider or insurer side could diminish use of services such as gatekeeping practices in insurance plans or capacity constraints among providers (e.g., lack of infrastructure to bill for private insurance reimbursement). We are unable to directly test these possibilities with the current study, but these are important topics for further research.
Our predictions in terms of insurance status and treatment payment sources are broadly supported by the data. As predicted, following the dependent coverage provision, young adults receiving SUD treatment are more likely to hold and use private insurance to pay for treatment, and these increases were largely offset by decreases in public insurance and uninsurance and self-pay and payment from government sources. Interestingly, we did not observe a commensurate decline in Medicaid payments. Several factors may explain this unexpected outcome. First, our payment variable is measured with error as it does not capture all possible sources of payment (only the payment source that covers 50% or more of the cost). Second, Medicaid has been shown, in many cases, to offer more generous coverage than private insurance, which may partially account for our null findings (Garfield et al., 2010) .
Our findings have additional important welfare implications. The dramatic changes in health insurance coverage and payment source among young adults after the provision suggest that expanded private coverage under the ACA may transform the financing of SUD treatment (Buck, 2011; Guerrero et al., 2014; Mechanic, 2012) . In particular, this expansion appears to have shifted some of the financial burden of SUD treatment from government payers and patients to private insurers, even if collection of private revenue continues to lag increases in private insurance.
As noted earlier, a substantial share of SUD treatment costs are borne by state and federal payers. Shifts in coverage may represent a financial savings of treatment dollars that can be reallocated within state budgets. For example, for the 214,528 adults aged 21-24 who received treatment in 2012, our estimates imply that the dependent coverage provision resulted in 7978 additional individuals for whom private payment was the main payment source. When recently published private insurance treatment costs for young adults of $6785 are adopted (Thomas et al., 2016) , a back-of-the-envelope estimate implies increased annual private payment of $54m and financial savings to public payers of about $32m and to self-payers of about $16m (with small savings also accruing to Medicaid).
Downstream, it remains to be seen whether an infusion of private insurance funding will transform the SUD delivery system and whether or not such a transformation will improve patient outcomes. On the one hand, private insurance companies may play a more active role in integrating SUD treatment with general healthcare delivery, which could facilitate coordinated care for patients and, in turn, improve outcomes for patients. Moreover, private insurance may offer new revenue streams to SUD treatment facilities and such revenue may allow facilities to improve their quality of care. However, if private insurance companies implement stricter gatekeeping practices, these changes may have negative impacts on care and outcomes. Finally, if expansions of private insurance cause providers to substitute away from the publicly insured or the uninsured (Maclean et al., 2015) , this response may lead to reductions in access for some patient groups.
These potential changes to the SUD treatment delivery system have implications beyond the dependent coverage provision. Specifically, the 2014 coverage provisions of the ACA allocate funds for states to expand Medicaid and create a national regulated marketplace in which individuals can purchase private insurance plans that are required to include SUD benefits. By early 2016, an estimated 20 million individuals had gained coverage under ACA provisions (ASPE, 2016) . Whether or not these provisions are maintained over the long term, our study underscores the difficulty of using private insurance expansion as a tool to increase access to SUD treatment.
